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I. Introduction *
One of the most contentious issues of the ongoing Brexit negotiations is the treatment of clearinghouses once the UK is out of the European single market. UK's departure gives rise to problems relating to the supervision of clearinghouses for euro-denominated products. Additionally, clearinghouses are major profit generators for financial venues and that is why Frankfurt intensifies its attempts in attracting London's business.
1 Ultimately, the relationship that the EU and the UK will strike will define the relationship of their financial institutions. The scenario that seems more likely today would envisage an economic integration agreement similar to CETA. Understanding how financial services liberalization works in trade agreements is crucial to gain a broader perspective of the international supply of financial services. Financial markets are so interconnected that regulation of one state fundamentally impacts on other jurisdictions. This explains the US involvement and strong advocacy as regards the Brexit plans of clearinghouses.
2 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the US derivatives regulator, opposes the current plans because market disruptions could emerge and even threats to ban European banks from US financial market infrastructure. Thus, the regional integration of financial services is crucial for the operation of financial market infrastructure. Shedding light on the liberalization of regionalism and explaining its elements are this study's purpose
In particular, this paper aims to (i) map out how financial services' regionalism, illustrated by Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs), 3 compares and contrasts with the liberalization of financial services at the multilateral trading system, and to (ii) investigate the role of national financial regulations in that context. The increasing importance of regionalism in international trade, while multilateral negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) have stalemate effects, makes this exercise highly relevant. 4 . One of the EIAs' objectives is to decrease or eliminate the barriers to trade in services and investment among their Members. This study assesses the liberalization depth of financial securities' clearing and settlement services in EIAs. To that end, I evaluate how the regulation of international trade contributes to the integration of financial services, on the one hand, and explore the transnational dynamics and trends that explain the integration of the service's sector in question, on the other. The recent proliferation of concluded EIAs on trade in services underscores their importance for international trade and policy, and at the same time brings into the spotlight the need for a better understanding of the plurilateral trading system's ramifications in the liberalization of services.
Carrying out this exercise is crucial to delineate the relationship between trade in services under disparate legal orders, namely, under the WTO and under EIAs. The mechanics and asymmetric architecture of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 5 have been examined thoroughly * I want to express my gratitude to Petros C. Mavroidis, Bernard Hoekman, Carlo Maria Cantore, Adam Jakubik, and Ioannis Galariotis for their valueable comments to previous drafts and discussions. All errors remain my own.
by literature. However, it is worth highlighting that the liberalization of trade in services is principally contingent on WTO Members' GATS commitments under Articles XVI, and XVII on market access, and national treatment, respectively. 6 The research question of this paper is not concerned with the GATS levels of liberalization per se, but rather the liberalization depth in EIAs. In that endeavor, the WTO Members' commitments under the GATS are used as the benchmark to measure how much beyond them the undertaken commitments in EIAs extend. The methodology of this study is developed in detail in the next section. The forthcoming paragraphs summarize the importance of clearing and settlement services for the integrity of financial systems, and their regulatory evolution as of today.
Financial instruments' clearing and settlement services have been regulated by international trade for the first time in late nineties, when the GATS Annex in Financial Services entered into force. 7 Since then, a lot has changed in terms of the services prominence in world economies' financial market infrastructure. In particular, the industry itself has been subject to numerous changes driven by the force of regulation across the globe. Regardless of the economic model followed by WTO Members and the underlying competition structures of clearing and settlement service suppliers, whether monopolistic, or oligopolistic, the interconnectedness of international finance cannot permit major operational discrepancies that can result in financial market disruptions, and potentially place the whole system's financial stability into jeopardy. Importantly, clearing and settlement services are traditionally tasked with addressing the risks associated with the trading of financial instruments, such as the failure of a counterparty to fulfill its part of the deal in a derivatives transaction or even the "loss" of a security due to its high exchangeability, being the "back-office" activity of trading securities. 8 That said, clearing and settlement services have been part of the financial markets since late nineteenth century, 9 but their relevance today has been shaped due to the regulatory swift responding to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.
In the aftermath of the crisis, and in accordance with the G-20 mandate, financial regulations that place the functioning of clearinghouses in the epicenter of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets were crafted. The new role attributed to clearinghouses pertains to requiring the mandatory clearing of certain types of OTC derivatives, 10 that can potentially have a systemic spillover effect in case one of the counterparties to the transaction goes bust.
11 This regulatory change aspires to reduce the perils posed by derivative markets, while taking into consideration that additional costs levied to trading parties, by the posting of collateral. This regulatory trend is in sharp contrast to what used to occur, where financial institutions were free to choose whether they wanted to employ clearing services or proceed the transaction without. Accordingly, the whole business of clearing has developed since then, and interestingly, this study seeks to investigate if this regulatory swift has impinged on the liberalization of clearing services, traced in EIAs. The GATS commitments on clearing services are ubiquitous in the multilateral trading system. Nonetheless, they are not apt to capture regulatory evolution because they 6 WTO Members voluntarily enter commitments on market access (Article XVI), national treatment (XVII), and additional commitments (XVIII) in their GATS Schedules, which constitute treaty text, on the basis of their national preferences. Liberalization is attained in the multilateral trading system in accordance to these specific commitments. As long as WTO Members decide to open more services sectors to international competition from other WTO Members, more liberalization is achieved. Accordingly, there is a positive relation between the process of entering commitments and the liberalization of services. 7 The GATS Annex on Financial Services explicitly refers in its indicative list to clearing services in par. 5(a)(xiv): settlement and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, derivative products, and other negotiable instruments. 8 For general literature on financial instruments clearing and settlement services in the European Union see D. Turing, Clearing and Settlement, 2017, Bloomsbury. 9 For a historical narrative of clearinghouses see Neal L. Wolkoff and Jason B. Werner, "History of Regulation of Clearing in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, The," Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 30 (2010): 313. 10 Such as interest rate swaps, foreign exchange, and credit default swaps among others.
are not updated by WTO Members. This paper seeks to identify whether EIAs are better placed to encounter these regulatory challenges.
Investigating the commitments undertaken by WTO Members for clearing and settlement services in EIAs, leads to measuring the depth of their liberalization, while aiming to take a grasp of the underlying dynamics that are the driving forces of the observed integration model. What are the geographical trends that contribute to the liberalization of international clearing trade-flows, or, what type of restrictions in the integration of these services are placed in EIAs are some of the questions to be addressed. This paper is structured as follows: Section II, sets out the methodology of the study. Section III, sheds light on the descriptive statistics and observations drawn by the study to deploy a comprehensive analysis of the stakes involved. Section IV, adopts a line of argument with regards to the relationship between the regulation of financial services and the law of international trade based on the findings of the paper. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. Methodology
One of the overarching objectives of this contribution is to establish a comprehensive typology of the commitments pertinent to clearing and settlement services in EIAs. Our analysis covers the 152 EIAs currently in force, 12 which have been notified to the WTO up to September 2018 under Article V (Economic Integration) of the GATS, under Article XXIV (Territorial Application -Frontier TrafficCustoms Unions and Free-trade Areas) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT-1994) , and the Enabling Clause (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation on Developing Countries). The scope of this paper is limited to the agreements that the level of their integration utilizes the trade liberalizing toolkit provided by the GATS. Namely, deeply integrated economic unions are not examined because their inclusion would not add any value, as the tools employed to further integrate these markets (i) deviate from the traditional trade instruments and as a result cannot serve the purposes of this empirical study because they are not comparable, and (ii) represent a small fraction (12/152) of the number of agreements notified to the WTO. 13 The two main set of documents that this analysis is premised on are undoubtedly the schedules of commitments, and the list of reservations of the parties to the EIAs, which are usually in the form of annexes attached to the main agreement. Nonetheless, in numerous occasions recourse to the agreements' chapters and side documents, such as protocols, communication letters, understandings, and other documents associated with the EIAs is necessary to obtain a holistic perspective of this study's subject matter.
Henceforth, since the nature of this inquiry is to measure the liberalization of clearing and settlement services in EIAs, it is essential to clarify the tools that are employed to that end. Traditionally, trade in services is supplied through the GATS four (4) modes of supply: namely, cross-border supply (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2), commercial presence (mode 3), and movement of persons (mode 4).
When it comes to wholesale financial services, such as the ones of clearing and settlement, immediately mode 4 becomes redundant, because these types of services are provided by large financial institutions, rather than by individuals. Therefore, this study examines the liberalization of clearing and settlement services for modes 1, 2, and 3. Furthermore, same as in the multilateral trading system, in EIAs the liberalization of financial services is effectuated through undertaken commitments on market access, and national treatment, which are contingent upon specific mode of supply. Thus, the modes of supply and the entered commitments on market access and national treatment are the existing variables that define the level of liberalization of clearing and settlement services in EIAs.
For the sake of clarity, it shall be underlined that while evaluating the level of liberalization of clearing and settlement services in EIAs on the basis of the abovementioned landmarks (modes of supply, and commitments), challenges emerge due to the different approach that countries adopt in scheduling their commitments.
15 Namely, the three more frequently met methods are: on the one hand (i) positive lists, which mirror the scheduling approach put forward in the GATS. In specific, countries in their schedules of commitments include all the services sectors and subsectors, and attached to them they inscribe whether they undertake particular commitments for market access and national treatment for the particular modes of supply; on the other hand (ii) negative lists follow the approach used for the first time in North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The negative list approach instead of schedules of commitments, has list of reservations which strictly refer to the measures that are not subject to full commitment (complete liberalization). Thirdly, (iii) hybrid lists have emerged as a model that combines characteristics of the two latter. For instance, hybrid lists use positive list for cross-border supply and negative lists for establishment. Traditionally, negative listing is closer than its positive counterpart to the objective of trade liberalization because it forces states to scrutinize their regulatory frameworks and check its compatibility with trade disciplines, before concluding their trade agreements, where they have to include these measures in their list of reservations in concreto. The challenges met in the process of collecting the empirics of this study lie with the inherent differences of the two approaches. To produce a comprehensive dataset that measures the level of liberalization of EIAs it is necessary to first compile and structure the data in a uniform fashion. To that end, in the process of compiling the data from EIAs with negative lists, I translated them into positive commitments so that the contribution can be more thorough and provide for a clearer picture of the overall EIA's status quo.
The question that next comes to mind relates to the methodology adopted to gauge the "depth" of the just-described liberalization. For starters, WTO Members have undertaken commitments in their GATS schedules for clearing and settlement services. These commitments naturally mirror the GATS asymmetric geometry, and are different for each and every WTO Member. Notably, this chapter investigates for the first time the clearing and settlement services' commitments of parties to EIAs. Once the commitments of EIA parties are mapped out, they are juxtaposed to the ones entered by the same countries in their GATS schedules. The outcome of the juxtaposition between the countries' commitments in EIAs, and their commitments under the GATS defines the liberalization depth. More specifically, there are 4 possible scenarios in that score: first, if country's x undertaken commitments in a EIA fall below the GATS threshold, then this is a GATS-minus. However, due to the existence of the GATS Article II on MFN, this category constitutes nothing but a legal fiction; second, if country x has entered in a EIA the exact same commitments, as the ones under the GATS, then we have a GATS liberalization depth; third, if the commitments of country x in a EIA go beyond the ones in the GATS, This contribution aims first to empirically assess the liberalization levels of clearing and settlement services in EIAs, and second to explore the underlying dynamics and trends that spearhead the surveyed liberalization. For instance, an essential query that this study seeks to address relates to which geographical regions put forward the liberalization agenda for these financial market infrastructure services and if possible, interpret the reasons behind. The recent history of the GATS has taught us that it was the US, and its industry, alongside with the European Communities, at the time, that aspired and managed to introduce an international rulebook for the trade in financial services. 16 Has something changed in the course of the next two decades, or are the same regions the net exporters of financial services? The case study of clearing and settlement services is going to be a helpful guide in this respect. Next, other trends in terms of the specific services sector are discerned based on the empirics, such as the negative or positive listing and which is more prone to furnish liberalization. Additionally, new regulatory frameworks for clearinghouses across the globe, in the aftermath of the crisis, started being enacted around 2010. How does this regulatory trend blend in the liberalization of clearing services in EIAs? This study will try to give an answer to that as well.
After having contextualized the features of this paper and explained the methodological steps that the analysis undertakes, it is time to venture into the empirics of this study in order to engage in the subject matter and put forward the arguments of this contribution. First, the scope of the study becomes evident and furthermore, the trends that have been identified in the EIAs' commitments on clearing and settlement services are discussed.
III. Empirical analysis

Findings
Before delving into the more granular aspects of this paper, it is essential to introduce its precise scope, and its main features. To start with, as mentioned above, this study covers the EIAs, included in Table  1 , which regulate securities' clearing and settlement services, and at least one party has made commitments. 17 Additionally, the timeframes of their conclusions are comprised in the next two columns so that the chronological trends in terms of the scheduling approaches (either through positive, negative or hybrid lists), and liberalization levels that exceed the GATS state of play can be initially drawn, before we further shed light on them in the course of the analysis. Out of the 102 EIAs, 49 use schedules of commitments (positive lists) and 48 lists of reservations (negative lists), while 3 are hybrids. The fifth column observes whether at least one party to the EIA in question enters commitments on clearing and settlement services that are more trade liberalizing than the ones it has undertaken in the multilateral trading system, under the GATS. Interestingly, 64 EIAs extend higher commitments than the ones under the GATS regime. The specifics of this table are examined infra. , 2003. 17 In subsection 3 infra, the 38 preferential trade agreements that either do not regulate trade in financial services or do not furnish specific set of commitments for clearing and settlement services are examined. Particular behavioral patterns and geographical trends are discerned.. 
Comments on EIAs commitments: stability and competition considerations
This subsection investigates the comments that parties to EIAs have attached to their commitments on financial instruments' clearing and settlement services. The importance of this exercise principally lies in discovering different countries perceptions/intentions over the underlying services on the one hand, and discerning potential trends on the other. Regardless the major differences between the two financial market infrastructure services sectors, due to their CPC classification they are always examined hand in hand in all plurilateral trade agreements, same as in the GATS. Nonetheless, such categorization posits complexity to trade negotiators charged with bargaining over trade in financial services issues because it links two significantly different industries under the same roof. We contend that the silo that exists between the trade and finance teams of most countries administrations is to blame for the lack of convergence of the two disciplines. This dichotomy between trade and finance administrations is exemplified strikingly by the content of PTAs, whereby no reflections of the financial industry's evolution in terms of commitments or specific provisions are recorded. Below, Table 2 sheds light on the comments pertinent to the subject matter of the study and later we discuss the way these comments explain the state of play of international clearing and settlement trade-flows, as at the same time we attempt to interpret the relation between trade commitments and international finance. The comments attached to the commitments on financial assets' clearing and settlement services can serve as a good indicator of how the trade negotiating teams of some states understand this sector of high relevance for the integrity of international financial systems. In addition, while identifying some patterns in the entering commitments process in EIAs, the study indicates that the existing silo between financial regulators and trade negotiators does not facilitate their much-needed interaction. Namely, the absence of this interaction is at odds with the liberalization of financial services and the promotion of international competition. Let us first review the prevalent trends, before we commence the discussion on their implications in the transnational regulatory framework.
First, the common denominator among Singapore, in all the EIAs it has concluded, alongside Korea, in its preferential agreements with Australia and the US, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in their commitments under GCC-Singapore, is that they all limit market access of clearing and settlement services for domestically listed securities. 18 The clear-cut rationale behind this barrier to trade is no other than financial stability considerations. Financial stability constitutes an overarching priority for regulators. Especially in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, States have ostensibly payed lots of attention to restructuring their regulatory architecture in ways that can potentially address perilous scenarios. The services provided by clearinghouses for OTC derivatives have been at the forefront of financial rulebooks' revisions, to mitigate the systemic risks involved in these transactions. Nonetheless, financial stability considerations are not only met in the context of financial regulatory standards and supervisory boards' list of priorities, but they are additionally encountered in the GATS Annex in Financial Services, 19 and in most of the concluded EIAs. 20 The prudential exemption embedded in trade agreements is designed to offer to regulators all the regulatory space they need to address situations of emerging financial instability, while filtering whether the corresponding measures' are fit for the purpose, without providing for unnecessary trade barriers. The next paragraph attempts to appraise to what extent the limitation met at the abovementioned EIAs' commitments can be justified under 18 For instance, Korea in its EIA with the US phrases that: only the Korea Securities Depository and the Korea Exchange may perform liquidation and settlement of securities and derivatives listed or traded on the Korea Exchange. Or, Singapore for the provision of cross-border (mode 1) services always mandates that the services are: unbound except for the provision of settlement and clearing services for financial assets which are listed on overseas exchanges only. 19 For thorough analysis of the role of the GATS prudential carve-out (PCO) in respect of filtering the European Union regulatory framework for clearinghouses, see above in Chapter III. 20 For an empirical approach and a comprehensive analysis of the role of the PCO in EIAs, and its negotiating history in the GATS The recent crisis illustrated the interconnectedness of national financial markets, which was evidenced in the proliferation effects of securitized financial instruments in derivative markets around the world. 21 Clearing and settlement are the so-called "back-office" services which are destined to support the trading of financial instruments. The whole business of financial market infrastructure is international in nature because it mirrors the way financial market transactions occur in parallel to the operations of multinational financial institutions. Additionally, it shall be clarified that especially after the regulatory overhaul, based on the G-20 mandate, international competition for the clearing of OTC derivatives is omnipresent. However, foreign competition of clearing services is contingent upon equivalence or substituted compliance regimes, 22 which test whether the rules of other States and the supervision and enforcement of clearinghouses are on the same page as theirs. Hence, one observation that can be made at the outset about the limitation of clearing and settlement of home listed securities from foreign entities is that it does not encourage competition in the respective sectors. The conundrum in striking the right balance between financial stability and competition in financial services is not yet resolved, 23 and accordingly there is no established path for States to steer their national regulatory policies.
Additionally, these services sectors have been traditionally subject to monopolistic competition structures, and only within the last 20 years competition has started emerging in certain States. Another observation to be made is that the countries that decide to have their home listed securities cleared and settled within their own jurisdiction do it on the premise that the integrity of their capital markets would not be affected by possible malfunction of a foreign financial institution. This rationale seems absolutely legitimate and in line with the prudential carve-out provision embedded not only in the GATS, but also in most of the EIAs examined here. Nonetheless, financial instruments' clearing and settlement from foreign service suppliers, which currently becomes increasingly relevant does not seem to pose any systemic stability problem, as long as the institutions themselves are robust and well managed. The shift to international competition on the relevant financial market infrastructure services, such as clearing and settlement, is gradual. 24 Nonetheless, liberalization in the sector does not seem to pose any risk for the integrity of financial markets. This national treatment and market access reservation circumscribes possible subsidies measures destined to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The reservation thereto seems to be prophetic in a number of ways. At first, it captures what happened in the banking sectors of Europe and the US, as a response to the 2008 crisis vicious cycle when banks had to be rescued with public money (taxpayers' contributions). These regulatory options are not prima facie consistent with the rules of international economic law and domestic EU competition law, 26 and thus, this reservation explicitly provides for the necessary latitude to Singaporean authorities. Furthermore, it resonates the systemic importance of financial market infrastructure, something that today more than ever is true for the functioning of clearinghouses and their international trade-flows.
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, no WTO law litigation arose with regards to the States' support to the banking industry. Nevertheless, one may wonder to what degree did these bailout practices, both in the EU and the U.S., distort competition in relevant markets, encourage good practices, and promote national champions. The discussion over banks' bailouts exceeds the scope of this study, but it suffices to say that the reasons that lead to this course of action involved the consideration of market failures of international financial institutions could result in negative externalities for domestic financial systems, in addition to their prominence in buying and holding sovereign debt. In the same vein, what is special about Singapore's reservation is that it caters for a treaty provision in a trade agreement that reflects on the considerations of the financial industry and the state itself, while the majority of WTO Members when concluding trade agreements tend to overlook financial services' intricacies. In particular, this reservation does not solely rely on the existence of the prudential carve-out for rainy days, but rather represents a well-thought expression of domestic protection from outside judicial scrutiny in the case of turmoil in financial market infrastructure. Thus, Singapore in this reservation sets a good precedent on meaningful considerations of financial services included in Economic Integration Agreements, regardless the possible anticompetitive effects of such provision.
Not surprisingly, it is impossible to foresee all the potential competition and stability evolutions of the financial services industry. Nonetheless states should at least strive for explaining and communicating to their trade delegations all the issues of relevance for international trade and accordingly support them in the challenging task of liberalizing these markets through international agreements. Therefore, the Singaporean reservation at issue, although potentially trade-restrictive, constitutes a great example of interaction between the trade and finance teams of its government and attempts to strike a fair balance between competition and stability in an international trade agreement.
EIAs not regulating trade in securities' clearing and settlement services and international finance
The rationale of the forthcoming analysis is to elucidate which are the EIAs that do not promulgate (i) the liberalization of financial services, and (ii) explore the underlying reasons behind. To address this question a review of the EIAs legal texts, and political economy considerations is required. The clearing and settlement of securities is a part of the broader realm of financial services, and that is why this study is necessary before we delve into their specific commitments undertaken for this services sector. In terms of sheer numbers, out of the 152 preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO, as of 24 th May 2018, 37 either do not capture trade in financial services at all, or even if they do, their commitments are set out in abstracto, either in the form of future rounds of negotiations or in vague or weak commitments that do not even rise to the WTO threshold. This exercise can serve as a useful guide to shed light on the parts of the world that do not seem to be eager proponents of financial services integration, and to provide for the explanations why, while illuminating on some observed patterns on the basis of the collected data. Additionally, trade agreements are not only about the promotion of economic interests, but also political considerations and zones of influence play a major role in their conclusion. First, Table 3 records the 37 EIAs that are observed not to be financial services liberalization proponents with the legal justification traced in the content of these trade treaties, and then an analysis that underscores and elaborates on the most important aspects is deployed. Pursuant to Art. 13-02 (4) and 10-02 (2) (a) the Agreement does not cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor cross-border supply, respectively.
PanamaChile 07-Mar-08
Pursuant to Art. 10.1 (3) (a) the Agreement does not cover financial services.
Peru -Chile 01-Mar-09
Pursuant to Art. 11.1 (4) (a) and 12.1 (3) (a) the Agreement does not cover trade in financial services for neither investment purposes nor cross-border supply, respectively. The content of the Table above illustrates which are the EIAs that do not regulate trade in financial services. To start with, the common denominator among these regional trade agreements is that their participating countries, on average seem to be financial services net importers, rather than exporters. This means that since their financial industries do not have the capacity to export, and as a result generate revenues through trade in financial services, the inclusion of financial services chapters or commitments is hardly of any relevance to them. On the contrary, it can only hinder the course of the EIA negotiations.
To substantiate this claim it suffices to show in the table that the vast majority of the parties to these EIAs are Latin American and Caribbean countries which, with the exception of Panama, 27 are not interested in exporting financial services, because of the nature of their economies. 28 However, as demonstrated by Stephanou, 29 trade in financial services liberalization in EIAs is highly contingent upon the bargaining power of the parties to the agreement. The three well-known categories 27 Panama is an off-shore financial hub which constitutes an important financial services exporter, especially given its size. are, the so-called, "North-South" EIAs, which refer to the agreements that are concluded between developing and developed countries, the "South-South" EIAs, signed between developing countries, and the ones between developed countries characterized as "North-North". Unsurprisingly, when it comes to the first category (North-South), due to the existing strong and asymmetric bargaining power between the concluding parties, it is observed that the liberalization of financial services is in the top of the agenda. 30 Contrary to that, the second category (South-South), although it is of vital importance for the growth and development of the contracting states, does not seem to be concerned about capturing financial services, or liberalizing them. This pattern is predominantly evidenced in this study, and the content of Table 3 . Namely, 21 EIAs between developing countries do not cover the trade in financial services, and Latin and Caribbean countries are the main participants. 31 Consequently, it is held that when developing countries conclude trade agreements with one another they do not necessarily include of financial services, for the reason that it is not an area of special interest to their economies. The inclusion of financial services' sectors to their trade agreement does not contribute to their growth, while the negotiating costs would surge. It is efficient from their perspective to leave them out of their EIAs. Nonetheless, when developing states negotiate EIAs with "North" states, then they are leveraged into the inclusion of financial services in the agreements. That comes as a natural consequence, since bigger and economically robust countries are more prone to exert pressure and achieve their goals in the conclusion of EIAs. As a result, the same "South" states when they conclude EIAs with "North" states, not only they include financial services in their agreements, but they tend to offer higher commitments than the ones entered in their GATS schedule. The analysis that follows examines the "depth" of the undertaken clearing and settlement services commitments in EIAs. Before bringing our attention to this topic, it is intriguing to succinctly underline another trend observed in the absence of firm commitments on financial services in EIAs.
The analysis so far examines trade agreements as contracts that reflect the rational economic behavior of the participating states. This approach represents the general norm, but the existence of additional means and rationales that are not solely economic and according to which EIAs are designed and implemented should not be disregarded. An example of an alternative course of action is the European Union in the EIAs concluded with Western Balkans; namely, Albania, Montenegro, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
32 These agreements regulate both trade in goods and in services, including financial services, but their primary goal is not to liberalize financial markets of Western Balkans and accrue the associated benefit of free trade, but to stabilize the region and encourage its economic growth.
Another facet of international trade is pertinent to establishing relations between states and promoting their peace and prosperity. The EU through these agreements does exactly that, and meanwhile it extends its geopolitical influence to the territories of the Western Balkans' contracting countries. These Stabilization and Association Agreements are not comprehensive in terms of the commitments inscribed for the liberalization of financial services, but that is exactly because that is not the reason behind the conclusion of these treaties. By signing these treaties the European Union seeks to distribute the benefits of trade to these states, in order for them to grow economically, while being transacting with European 30 This has been observed in literature, especially with regard to the EIAs that the United States and the European Union have concluded, and it is brought into the spotlight empirically in the context of clearing and settlement commitments, in subsection 5. 31 The "South-South" EIAs that do not cover trade in financial services are the following: Chile-Colombia, Chile-Costa Rica, Chile-El Salvador, Chile-Guatemala, Chile-Honduras, Chile-Mexico, Chile-Nicaragua, Colombia-Mexico, Colombia-El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras, Costa Rica-Peru, El Salvador-Chinese Taipei, Guatemala-Chinese Taipei, Mexico-Central America, Panama-Chile, Peru-Chile, GUAM, Iceland-Faroe Islands, Dominican Republic-Central America, East African Community (EAC), and Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership. 32 These agreements fall under the Stabilization and Association Agreements that the EU concludes in order to promote peace, freedom, stability, and economic prosperity through trade to the region. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/western-balkans/.
Union Member States. The next subsection starts addressing how commitments on financial securities' clearing and settlement services are entered in regional trade agreements. Next, the "depth" of these commitments is investigated, using the ones undertaken under the GATS as the benchmark.
Clearing and Settlement Commitments in EIAs: The countries that lead the way and the playbook of international dynamics for financial services i) Aggregate number of clearing and settlement commitments in EIAs
We first investigate the mere number of clearing and settlement commitments that have been entered and received by WTO Members in the context of the unravelling effects of the exponential spike of regionalism. At the outset, this study illustrates the intentions of EIA parties to further integrate this particular financial services sectors with their trading partners. The countries that are financial services net exporters, as shown in Figure 1 , are the ones that strive for higher levels of trade in financial services liberalization, through the preferential trade agreements they conclude. As a result, their trade policy agenda is oriented around the premise of acquiring commitments to that end. By receiving market access (MA), and national treatment (NT) commitments by their EIA partners, the principal challenges, in the form of qualitative and discretionary barriers to trade, that their suppliers can encounter in providing financial services in the respective markets are limited.
Next, after having set out the primary information collected in terms of clearing and settlement commitments, 33 a more detailed analysis proceeds which factors in the specific level of liberalization observed in EIAs, using as benchmark the GATS state of affairs at the multilateral trading field. Additionally, the international dynamics are put into context through a network analysis, whereby the countries with higher leverage are able to steer the behavior of smaller countries into opening their financial services markets to international competition. Geographical and chronological observations comes into play later on. First, Figure 1 below depicts in an aggregate fashion the number of commitments for securities' clearing and settlement services that parties to EIAs have entered for their trading partners, and accordingly, have received from them. 33 Clearing and settlement commitments for the purpose of this figure amount to at least either a national treatment or a market access commitment of a party to an EIA for one of the 3 modes of supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad, and commercial presence) that constitute the scope of this study.
Trade in Financial Services Regionalism: Derivatives Clearing and Settlement in Economic Integration Agreements
European University Institute 21 Figure 1 reveals that the countries that are the major financial services net exporters, such as the Members of the European Union, the United States, Singapore, Switzerland and Hong Kong among others, 34 are the ones that have the tendency (i) to provide for commitments in clearing and settlement services, since they have already very advanced financial industries, and they are not afraid of foreign competition, and accordingly, (ii) to receive commitments on this service sector from their EIA partners. The US financial industry has been traditionally "offensive" in acquiring access to its trading partners jurisdiction, while having the bargaining power to leverage its own terms in trade agreements. 35 As the figure shows, the United States comes first in the aggregate number of EIA commitments, having undertaken and received 19 commitments, followed by the European Union, having entered 17 commitments on clearing and settlement services, while having received 15. Panama, Singapore, and Australia are also high on the list. The analysis that follows in sub-section ii, investigates the specific commitments and their intrinsic characteristics.
36
To embark on explaining figure 1, the observations have to be examined in parallel with the mere fact that economically robust countries and big regional powers, as the US and the European Union, respectively, have concluded the highest number of preferential trade agreements. Thus, since they have been members to numerous EIAs, it is not striking that these developed economies have acquired a high number of commitments on securities' clearing and settlement services. However, it should be highlighted that out of the 152 EIAs on services, only 100 comprise commitments on clearing and settlement services. Consequently, the fact that these countries have participated in many EIAs is a crucial indicator, but it is not self-evident that their trading partners shall liberalize their financial services sectors. At the same time it should not be disregarded that the parties to EIAs cannot be forced to enter commitments on financial services in their EIAs, but rather trade negotiations tend to play a tit for tat game.
To gain a better understanding on the reasons why WTO Members and parties to EIAs negotiate and conclude international trade agreements it is imperative to realize what triggers them to be in the negotiating table in the first place. One of the dominant answers is their belief in the benefits of free trade. Free trade, for starters, urges economic actors to seek and exploit their comparative advantage.
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Subsequently, free trade opens markets and incentivizes firms to be more productive and innovative in order to acquire a better share of the expanded pie; this comes with more competition in the international 34 The data of International Trade Center (ITC) on exports of financial services, computed on the basis of the balance of payments (BOPs), portray that the countries that were the principal financial services exporters for 2016 were the United States (approx. 97 billion USD), the United Kingdom (approx.. 71 billion USD), Luxembourg (approx. 55 billion USD), Germany, Switzerland, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Ireland, France, Canada, India, China and Australia among others. level. In addition, to these economic rationales it is also free trade that grants peace and prosperity to the nations that play by its rules, as the European Union experiment has proven since the end of World War II. These general benefits of free trade happen to materialize in tangible commitments when it comes to trade in services agreements, either in the context of the WTO or preferential trade agreements.
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The general principle is that since countries care to boost their economic growth they are prone to negotiate trade agreements that are suitable for allowing them to export the goods or services sectors that they have a comparative advantage on. For countries to acquire market access to the sectors they wish, they have to offer for something in return. Most of the times they have to provide for favorable treatment to the contracting parties' areas of interest. For a EIA hypothetical, assuming that country X has a very strong financial services industry, that represents 13% of its GDP, while country Y's economy is largely based on tourism, a win-win deal would be for the countries X and Y to negotiate a trade agreement that would open the financial services market of Y to the service providers of X, and at the same time would incentivize tourism trade-flows towards Y. On that premise trade negotiations are carried out, but in some occasions it is not only rationale economic thinking that dictates the terms of negotiations, but also the influence that big countries exert over smaller ones.
That has traditionally been the case for trade in financial services, since the first time they were regulated internationally under the GATS. The US financial industry lobbied for that in order to increase its share of the pie, and WTO Members followed up for their own reasons. For the purposes of this paper, it is essential to realize who are the main players in the international financial services arena, in order to develop a comprehensive analysis of the clearing and settlement services in EIAs in the first place, and to proceed by assessing how these countries conclude their EIAs, and under which terms and conditions. By now, it is clear that it is the European Union and the United States that internationally pull the strings for financial liberalization, 39 and it is this study's mission to witness how this trend is effectuated in the context of the financial service in question in EIAs. Accordingly, the analysis proceeds by measuring the "depth" of liberalization on clearing and settlement services in EIAs, and furthermore, scrutinizes the state of play of the EIAs that the United States and the European Union have concluded.
ii) Measuring the depth of clearing and settlement commitments in EIAs
The objective of this sub-section is to elucidate on the depth of the undertaken commitments on financial securities' clearing and settlement services in regional trade agreements, and at the same time investigate the driving factors and relevant parameters that are of importance in that endeavor. At the outset, this study denotes, as described in Section II, the level of liberalization on the basis of the status quo of WTO Members at the multilateral trading system, namely WTO Members' GATS commitments. Specifically, (i) GATS, once the level of liberalization is the same as in the Members' GATS schedule, (ii) GATS plus, once the Member provides for commitments in addition to its GATS schedule, and (iii) GATS extra, once the Member enters commitments for clearing and settlement services for the first time in EIAs. Categories (ii) and (iii) are together compounded as GATS+, for the sake of simplicity as the analysis of this empirical study unfolds. As a first step, figure 2 sets out the whole aggregate clearing and settlement services commitments in EIAs, which are 226 in total, charted in the y axe of time. This chronological illustration underscores whether the depth of liberalization (either at the same level as in the WTO "GATS" or going beyond "GATS+") evolves. The value of this graph lies in offering a holistic perspective of the way commitments in this financial services sector are entered in international trade and investment agreements over time.
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To interpret this figure accurately, it is imperative to understand first that out of the total number of commitments entered in EIAs for clearing and settlement services, half of them have adopted the GATS standard, whereas the other half has exceeded the GATS threshold. 40 What can also be discerned by the bars of the graph is that although in general there is an equilibrium between the GATS and the GATS+ commitments over the years, in 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2016 higher level of liberalization for clearing and settlement services has been effectuated in EIAs. It is extremely difficult to distinguish the determinants that drive these EIAs' GATS+ commitments, but the analysis proceeds by tracing the route these commitments follow, in order to reveal which countries open their clearing and settlement markets at first, and to whom through the conclusion of the economic integration agreements as a second consideration.
Subsequently, the empirical analysis focuses on the GATS+ commitments on financial securities' clearing and settlement services in international trade treaties. By exclusively examining this set of commitments it is easier to discern the factors that result in furthering the liberalization of financial services. To that end, the EIAs that liberalize clearing & settlement services beyond the GATS threshold are put into the microscope, Figures 3 and 4 set out the route that these commitments follow, and ultimately, their intrinsic characteristics are investigated below. Pursuing the objective of delineating which are the contributing factors in the liberalization of clearing and settlement services, Figures 3 and 4 underscore which are the countries that enter GATS+ commitments in EIAs, and which are the states that reap the benefits of this liberalization, respectively.
40 To be precise, computations based on the WTO RTA database reveal that 54,42%, till the 23 rd of May 2018, have used their GATS level of liberalization for financial securities' clearing and settlement services, whereas 45,58 have opted for deeper liberalization in the services sector in question. Should be reiterated that the figures here represent the commitments that provide for this services liberalization in EIAs, and not the ones that don't ("Unbound" for example), although this lack of commitment would represent the same level of liberalization as the one inscribed in some countries GATS schedules. To understand what goes beyond the GATS it is essential to understand first that the legal architecture of trade in services at the WTO is inherently asymmetric. This comes as the result of the political compromise that WTO Members stroke during the Uruguay Round in order to incorporate the regulation of trade in services in the text of the Marrakesh Agreements.
41 Trade in services, unlike trade in goods which is easier to engage in for developing economies, requires high expertise and is not inclusive in terms of the capacities that states and their industries have to achieve growth through its mechanics. By default advanced economies have a comparative advantage in trading services. To compensate for that and for the developing states to be persuaded in a consensus at the multilateral trading system, the provisions under the title "Commitments" had to be introduced. These commitments allow to WTO Members to provide for (progressive) liberalization to their services sectors, through market access and national treatment principally, as they please. Consequently, referring to the GATS asymmetric architecture means that each WTO Member has defined its own depth of liberalization in its GATS Schedule of commitments, and as a result there is no homogeneity. This context is furnished to accentuate that not all countries share the same starting point in liberalizing their services' sectors in the GATS, and financial services are not an exception to the rule.
When it comes to EIAs, the same principle applies with the difference that the liberalization attained under these agreements does not extend to all WTO Members, but only to the ones that are parties to the specific preferential trade agreement, which is in accordance with the GATS Article V. 42 The rationale of this provision is to encourage further liberalization of services, even this integration extends its benefits only to parts of the WTO system, assuming the conditions of the GATS Article V are fulfilled. For the purposes of this study, shall be stated that the existence of the GATS immense discretion in scheduling commitments has produced divergences in the liberalization of services among WTO Members. As a result, some countries have way more ground to cover to reach the levels of other countries. Additionally, financial services is a sector that traditionally protectionist policies are attached to, and clearing and settlement services do not deviate from this pattern.
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of WTO Members that go deeper than their GATS commitments on securities' clearing and settlement services while concluding EIAs are developing states, such as Panama, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica etc. This can partially be explained by the fact, that these states have lots of room to cover to liberalize their financial market infrastructure to the levels of developed WTO Members. This divergence on the liberalization of financial services can be easily exemplified by taking a look at the 20 states that have adopted the Understanding on the Commitments on Financial Services in contrast to the remaining WTO Members. In addition to that, some developed states as well opt for further opening their clearing markets, such as Japan, Australia, and Korea. To fully capture the dynamics that drive these states to the underlying policy decisions in EIAs, it is essential to investigate graphs 3 and 4 in tandem, in order to see which are the countries that are on the other side of the table, and accordingly, potentially reap the benefits of such liberalization effects. of market access and national treatment commitments. This is a ramification of their asymmetric bargaining power and strong interest in exporting financial services. As a result, their EIAs reflect these two contributing factors, and this is bluntly portrayed in the GATS+ commitments the EU and the US receive for the financial services sector in question. The next subsection explicitly oversees which are the WTO Members that offer these GATS+ commitments to the EU and the US to complete the picture of the regulation of international financial instruments' clearing and settlement trade flows.
iii) The roadmap of GATS+ clearing and settlement commitments for the EU and the US in EIAs
This subsection underlines which are the countries that offer GATS+ commitments to the EU and the US through the regional trade agreements they have concluded. As figures 5 and 6 show, the countries that inscribe GATS+ commitments in their schedules of commitments or lists of reservations with the US and the EU are highly similar with Latin American and Caribbean countries being the common denominator for the EIAs that both states have concluded. 
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These graphs show how securities' clearing and settlement services are regulated and liberalized in EIAs. Nonetheless, the liberalization of financial services is not only contingent on commitments undertaken under either the WTO or regional trade agreements, but most importantly it is dependent on the regulation of financial services by WTO Members. In a perfect universe, trade furnishes the norms and principles, such as non-discrimination and transparency, on the basis of which regulatory standards are constructed, assuming that market access and national treatment commitments have been inscribed for particular services sectors. Allowances must be made that trade sets out the general liberalizing patterns for services sectors, but it is the regulation of these sectors that prescribes the details and the specific conditions that domestic and foreign service providers have to comply with to ply their services. Thus, the trade of financial services is such a delicate field of law because the regulation of the services in question has to be calibrated with the international commitments of states under the GATS and other regional trade agreements. The next section ventures into an examination of the general patterns of the regulation of clearinghouses in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and serves as a utility to compass around the interaction between financial regulatory standards and regionalism.
IV. Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation and the States' silos in negotiating EIAs
This section aims to illustrate how the regulation of clearing services after 2010 has imminently changed the industry and has provided for the international standard on the basis of which the international clearing flows are effectuated, and to reveal that EIAs that have been concluded after 2010 do not seem to either mirror or adapt their scope to the twists and turns that industry has followed. Yet, international trade law and financial regulation are disparate legal disciplines, with different mechanics and points of reference. However, since they both prescribe legal norms for the regulation of the financial services' sector in question, one would reasonably expect that synergies exist between the two legal orders in order to promulgate a coherent set of rules, rather than having two systems that do not interconnect at all. The analysis underscores an absence of coordination between the trade and finance teams of WTO Members' administration, and wonders to what degree this deficiency can be mitigated.
In response to the G20 accord, States started heavily regulating the clearing of OTC derivatives around the world. Prudential regulations of clearinghouses seek to mitigate the risks associated to the trading of derivatives that can have a seismic impact from a financial stability perspective. To that end, financial rulebooks around the world have been very comprehensive in regulating the industry and all its specific characteristics. One of the aspects of these regulatory standards pertains to how clearinghouses from foreign jurisdictions can provide their services in domestic markets, to domestic entities or even having a substantial effect on them. These set of rules that permit foreign clearinghouses market access fall in general under the category of regulation called "third-country equivalence" or "substituted compliance" in the EU and the US, respectively.
43 Therefore, for foreign clearinghouses to offer their services in other jurisdictions the key is to comply with the abovementioned regimes.
Nonetheless, the regulation of international trade either under the WTO or under preferential trade agreements provides for its own set of rules for financial services, either in the form of market access or national treatment commitments, or in the form of recognition provisions. Due to the intricacies of financial regulation and the existing silo between trade and finance administrations, trade delegations at the WTO and the EIA negotiating teams do not seem to take account of the challenges ahead relevant to the regulation of financial market infrastructure. This claim is substantiated by the fact that the regulatory change on the role of clearinghouses globally is not reflected in anyway in the content of EIAs. To buttress this view it suffices to say that when a financial sector is subjected to major shifts of that scale, as the case of clearinghouses, which heavily impact on the terms-of-trade, it is only for international economic law to react accordingly in order to adjust to new realities. Therefore, by closely 43 For an analysis of the European regulatory framework and the examination of its consistency under WTO law see George A. Papaconstantinou, note 21. following the evolution of financial services, international economic law should utilize its toolkit so that not only it keeps up with the financial industry's progress, but also facilitates the integration of these services through encouraging international trade-flows. Nevertheless, this approach does not side with reality.
The drastic swift on the regulation of the financial industry described above is not captured by regionalism. Namely, neither the lists of reservations nor the schedules of commitments of the parties to EIAs, concluded after 2009, keep track with the changes. Alternatively, EIA parties by just inscribing next to the clearing and settlement category of their commitments that the supply of the services at issue hinges on specific provisions of their financial rulebooks, that translate the substituted compliance/thirdcountry equivalence frameworks, would have made a difference because at least the content of the trade agreement would provide for legal certainty with regards to the treatment of the financial sectors in question and would be consistent with the legal practices promulgated by states financial regulatory/supervisory authorities. However, this is emphatically not the case in EIAs, as evidenced by this study, and interestingly there is no mention of OTC derivatives as such in the content of preferential trade agreements in general, no matter their importance for many financial services sectors, and for securities' clearing and settlement in concreto, which are vested with harnessing it. Thus, the absence of coordination evidenced in this study brings into the spotlight the existent silos in WTO Members' administrations between finance and trade.
An additional dimension that trade delegations seem to disregard relates to the fact that financial services industries develop rapidly due to either the impetus of technology, 44 or the role of regulation in financial markets. Thus, it is imperative to device a mechanism in preferential trade agreements in order to revise the inscribed commitments or lists of reservations, on the basis of impact assessments that calibrate the existing legal texts to the new realities. Allowances should be made in respect of the specific means regarding the procedures of these revisions so that abusive practices are avoided. Such a scheme would be doubtful under the WTO, since negotiation rounds have stagnated for a long period. However, under EIAs one would expect that there is much room for improvement in that score because the parties to international trade agreements are more flexible and on average they are homogeneous.
Ultimately, this contribution suggests that assuming that there were synergies between the trade and finance teams of WTO Members, the associated benefits for the trade of financial services would be huge. First, because financial rulebooks would have transparent standards that can only promote trade openness and liberalization. Second, because the content of EIAs would be better informed about reflecting financial services sectors legal state of play, and as a result ameliorate the plurilateral trading relations and deepening their markets. Third, because trade and financial regulation need to work in parallel in order to tame financial innovation and to achieve financial stability.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper for the first time comprehensively evaluates in an empirical analysis the depth of liberalization attained in the plurilateral trading system for the financial services of securities' clearing and settlement in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This endeavor is driven by the need for examining the regulation of international trade and the one of financial services in parallel in order to attain legal certainty for the provision of the services in question, and to avoid situations under which the regulation of the one discipline does not capture the legal issues promulgated by the other, as it is the case argued by this study. 44 Technological progress tends to challenge the traditional forms of banking and finance and accordingly, change the financial industry as we know it. Innovations such as artificial intelligence or blockchain technologies nowadays spearhead the emergence of maverick companies and as a result many traditional financial services providers have started facing more competition. See for example Martin Arnold, Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/2f6f5ba4-dc97-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6.
The findings of this paper indicate that the integration of international financial market infrastructure services in economic integration agreements goes significantly beyond the threshold achieved in the WTO system by the GATS schedules of commitments. More importantly, it is observed that the beneficiaries of financial services liberalization traced in the clearing and settlement services of securities are principally the European Union and the United States. The main explanations for this trend put forward by this study are pertinent to the 2 States' bargaining power alongside with their strong interest in opening third countries' markets to their own financial service providers.
Ultimately, we evaluate how the regulation of financial market infrastructure, and in particular the one on clearinghouses crafted after 2010 comes to grips with the way preferential trade agreements are structured and deal with the services in question. We find that the silos in WTO Members' administrations between trade and finance teams are striking and that is substantiated by the mere fact that there is no indication in the content of EIAs that something has changed in terms of this financial services sector since 2009, even for the trade agreements concluded thereafter. This is problematic mainly for two reasons: first, because international trade law does not reflect and factor in the legal realities and regulatory standards, which represent the most important hurdles to services trade, which result in legal uncertainties; second, because both legal disciplines set out the rules for the operation of financial services it is quintessential to update EIAs in accordance with the mandates of financial regulation and not relying excessively on provision such as the prudential carve-out, so that further integration of financial services is attained. Finally, study argues that in order to remedy the mismatch between the evolving regulation of financial services and the static content of international economic agreements a frequent updating process of the agreements is required.
